Document 34: Department of State Cable from Kenneth W. Dam to United States Embassy in Jordan. "Rumsfeld Mission: Meeting with King Hussein in London," December 23, 1983.
Ambassador-at-large and presidential emissary Donald Rumsfeld discusses prospects for improving U.S.-Iraqi relations with King Hussein of Jordan. Rumsfeld reports on his talks with Saddam Hussein and Tariq Aziz and says they had "more areas of agreement than disagreement." He also reviews the status of a proposed pipeline to Aqaba for Iraq's oil.
The U.S. promoted the Aqaba pipeline project strenuously for several years during the early to mid 1980s.

It would have carried oil from northern Iraq to the Gulf of Aqaba in Jordan, alleviating the disruptive effect on Iraq's oil output that resulted from Iran's attacks on oil transshipment facilities in the Persian Gulf and from Syria's closing of a pipeline that had transported Iraqi oil. The proposed project reflected the U.S.'s extreme nervousness about threats to the world oil supply resulting from the Iran-Iraq war.
The U.S. involved several U.S.-based multinational corporations in planning the project.

International financier Bruce Rappaport, a friend of CIA director William Casey, was also a central figure in the proposed deal. (The final report of the independent counsel for the Iran-Contra "arms for hostages" scandal cites reports indicating that Rappaport's bank in Geneva was the recipient of a mysterious $10 million payment from the Sultan of Brunei to fund the Nicaraguan contras that subsequently disappeared. Rappaport denied this;

the final report says that the issue remained unresolved. He was invited to testify in 1999 at a House Banking committee hearing on corruption in Russian financial transactions, but declined.) The project was complicated by demands that the U.S. arrange for ironclad security guarantees from the Israelis, since the pipeline would have been vulnerable to their attack. The Israelis, for their part, demanded guarantees that pipeline facilities would not cause environmental damage.


All involved had their reasons for at least hypothetical interest in the project. For Iraq, it would have been a manifestation of improved U.S.-Iraq relations - they wanted as much U.S. financial and other involvement in the proposed deal as possible. For the U.S., it would have provided an alternative, theoretically secure outlet for oil and created a nexus for entangling Iraqi interests with those of Jordan and Israel, consistent with U.S. plans to create a wider consortium of Arab countries that would cooperate with the U.S. and would be willing to resolve the Palestine-Israel dispute on U.S. terms. Israel would have benefited from new oil facilities in its vicinity, and won points with the Reagan administration.

Also, according to internal documents from a friend of Reagan administration Attorney General Edmund Meese, brought in as an intermediary because of his Israeli ties, payoffs would have been skimmed from complex financial guarantee arrangements for the Israeli government and Labor Party.
Attempts to agree on arrangements that would satisfy all parties dragged on, until the several private companies that had been brought in to plan the project backed out, questioning the motives of all involved. Iraq, however, revived the concept in 2000, presumably for its own strategic interests.
Source: Court exhibit

Document 35: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Follow-up on Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad," December 26, 1983.
William Eagleton meets with Iraqi Under Secretary Mohammed al-Sahhaf to follow up on Donald Rumsfeld's visit. Eagleton discusses U.S. efforts to coordinate policy toward the Iran-Iraq war among Persian Gulf states, its campaign to stop arms sales to Iran, and its wish to see Iraq's oil exports increase. He informs the Iraqi official of the degree of U.S. interest in Iraq's economic situation, mentioning the "high level policy review which had established the environment and policy positions that had been conveyed to the Iraqi leadership by Ambassador Rumsfeld."
Eagleton comments, "Ambassador Rumsfeld's visit has elevated U.S.-Iraqi relations to a new level. This is both symbolically important and practically helpful."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 36: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Meeting With Tariq Aziz: Expanding Iraq's Oil Export Facilities," January 3, 1984. During a meeting following Donald Rumsfeld's talks, Tariq Aziz tells William Eagleton that President Saddam Hussein was pleased with the visit and with the positive atmosphere it created.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 37: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "[Excised] Iraqi Pipeline through Jordan," January 10, 1984.
The head of the U.S. interests section tells Washington, "the Iraqi leadership was extremely pleased with Amb. Rumsfeld's visit. Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way to praise Rumsfeld as a person . . ."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

__________________
"When any government, or any church for that matter, undertakes to say to its subjects, This you may not read, this you must not see, this you are forbidden to know, the end result is tyranny and oppression no matter how holy the motives."

Document 38: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Consulate General, Jerusalem. "Follow-up Steps on Iraq-Iran" [Includes Transmittal Sheet], January 14, 1984. The U.S. intensifies its diplomatic efforts to curtail arms sales to Iran and imposes anti-terrorism export controls on that country. However, it does not plan to prohibit U.S. imports of Iranian oil.
The U.S. was developing plans to liberalize its export policy for Iraq. The revised rules would permit the export of U.S.-origin armored ambulances, communications gear, and electronic equipment for the protection of Saddam Hussein's personal aircraft. The Reagan administration was continuing efforts to persuade the Export-Import Bank to provide financing for Iraq -- a positive Eximbank determination would improve Iraq's credit rating and make it easier for it to obtain loans from international financial institutions.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 39: Department of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Action Memorandum from David T. Schneider to George P. Shultz. "Easing Restrictions on Exports to Iraq," January 30, 1984.
The State Department presents the case for relaxing controls on exports to Iraq of militarily useful items. The department is concerned specifically with an application to export dual-use heavy trucks, the sale of which to either Iran or Iraq has been banned under the Export Administration Act. Secretary of State Shultz approves the proposed sale.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 40: Export-Import Bank of the United States, Country Risk Analysis Division Memorandum to the Export-Import Bank of the United States, Africa and Middle East Division, Board of Directors. "Country Review and Recommendations for Eximbank's Programs" [Extract; Includes Document Entitled "Appendix I: Iraq"], February 21, 1984.
The Export-Import Bank considers Iraq a bad credit risk because of its very high level of indebtedness and the uncertainty created by the Iran-Iraq war. An appendix lists U.S. companies that would be potential exporters to Iraq if credits were available, including Westinghouse, General Electric, Bechtel, and Halliburton.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 41: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Iraqi Warning re Iranian Offensive," February 22, 1984.
Between presidential envoy Donald Rumsfeld's two visits to Iraq to seek ways to improve U.S.-Iraq relations and to identify measures to assist Iraq's war efforts, the Iraqi military issues a statement declaring that "the invaders should know that for every harmful insect there is an insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever their number and Iraq possesses this annihilation insecticide."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 42: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Interests Section in Iraq. "U.S. Chemical Shipment to Iraq," March 4, 1984.
Indicates that a shipment of 22,000 pounds of phosphorous fluoride to Iraq was held back at JFK airport because of "concern over Iraq's possible intention to use the chemical in the manufacture of chemical weapons." Washington asks the U.S. interests section in Baghdad to remind Iraq's Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.'s grave concern about chemical weapons, and to inform it that the U.S.

will publicly condemn their use in the near future. The interests section is to reiterate the request that Iraq not use chemical warfare, and to say that the U.S. opposes Iraq's attempts to acquire chemical weapons related material from the U.S.: "When we become aware of attempts to do so, we will act to prevent their export to Iraq."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

__________________
"When any government, or any church for that matter, undertakes to say to its subjects, This you may not read, this you must not see, this you are forbidden to know, the end result is tyranny and oppression no matter how holy the motives."

Document 43: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Memorandum from James A. Placke to James M. Ealum [et al.]. [U.S. Condemnation of Iraqi Chemical Weapons Use], March 4, 1984.

The State Department circulates for review a draft press statement and guidance for a U.S. condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons. The statement says that "While condemning Iraq's chemical weapons use . . . . The United States finds the present Iranian regime's intransigent refusal to deviate from its avowed objective of eliminating the legitimate government of neighboring Iraq to be inconsistent with the accepted norms of behavior among nations and the moral and religious basis which it claims."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 44: Department of State Memorandum. "Notifying Congress of [Excised] Truck Sale," March 5, 1984.
The State Department informs a House Committee on Foreign Affairs staff member that the department has not objected to the sale of 2,000 heavy trucks to Iraq, noting that they were built in part in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and Michigan. The official policy of the U.S. is that it does not export military related items to Iraq or Iran. When asked if the trucks were intended for military purposes, the official responds, "we presumed that this was Iraq's intention, and had not asked."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 45: United States Interests Section in Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Iraq Reacts Angrily to U.S. Condemnation of CW [Chemical Weapons] Use," March 7, 1984.
Reports that Iraq's defense minister denounced the State Department's condemnation of Iraq's chemical weapons use. The U.S. interests section comments that "The Iraqis apparently have been stunned by our public condemnation."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 46: United States Embassy in Austria Cable from Helene A. von Damm to the Department of State. "Iranian War Wounded in Vienna," March 13, 1984.
The U.S. embassy in Austria tells the State Department that a Belgian laboratory found residual amounts of mustard gas and mycotoxin in the blood of Iranian war casualties brought to Vienna for medical treatment.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 47: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the Mission to the European Office of the United Nations and Other International Organizations. "U.N. Human Rights Commission: Item 12: Iranian Resolution on Use of Chemical Weapons by Iraq," March 14, 1984.
The State Department instructs the U.S. delegate to the United Nations to get the support of other Western missions for a motion of "no decision" regarding Iran's draft resolution condemning Iraq's use of chemical weapons. Failing that, the U.S. is to abstain on the resolution.
The U.S. is to emphasize points made in a recent State Department press conference, including the assertion that "The USG evenhandedly condemns the prohibited use of chemical weapons whenever it occurs."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act
Document 48: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Sudan. "Briefing Notes for Rumsfeld Visit to Baghdad [Page Missing]," March 24, 1984. A State Department background cable for Donald Rumsfeld's March 1984 visit to Baghdad notes the distress caused to Iraqi officials by the U.S.'s public condemnation of Iraq's use of chemical weapons "despite our repeated warnings that this issue would emerge sooner or later." Most of the cable is concerned with the Reagan administration's interest in reassuring Iraqi officials that U.S. financing might be available for the proposed pipeline to deliver Iraqi oil to Aqaba, and other U.S. regional interests. The cable notes that Iraqi officials are "confused" by the administration's "means of pursuing our stated objectives in the region."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 49: United States Embassy in Bahrain Cable from Donald Charles Seidel to the Department of State. "Middle East Mission: U.S. Efforts to Stop Arms Transfers to Iran," March 24, 1984.
In preparation for his second round of meetings with officials in Baghdad, Donald Rumsfeld asks for a list of the countries that the U.S. has approached in order to persuade them to cut off arms sales to Iran.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

__________________
"When any government, or any church for that matter, undertakes to say to its subjects, This you may not read, this you must not see, this you are forbidden to know, the end result is tyranny and oppression no matter how holy the motives."

Document 50: Mission to the United Nations Cable from Jeane J. Kirkpatrick to the Department of State. "U.N. Report on Chemical Weapons Use in Iran/Iraq War: Consideration in Security Council," March 28, 1984.

Reports British and Dutch efforts to draft a quick United Nations resolution condemning the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, describes evidence regarding Iraqi chemical weapons use, and passes on the observation by a U.N. official that "Iranians may well decide to manufacture and use chemical weapons themselves if international community does not condemn Iraq."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 51: Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Cover Memorandum from Allen Overmyer to James A. Placke. [United Nations Security Council Response to Iranian Chemical Weapons Complaint; Includes Revised Working Paper], March 30, 1984.

Reports that the U.N. Security Council decided to adopt the text of a draft Dutch resolution on chemical weapons and issue it as a presidential statement. "The statement, by the way, contains all three elements Hamdoon wanted."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 52: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Lebanon [et al.]. "Department Press Briefing, March 30, 1984," March 31, 1984.

The State Department announces it has imposed foreign policy controls on Iran and Iraq for exports of chemical weapons precursors. It responds to questions from the press about U.S. policy regarding the Iran-Iraq war, and a department spokesperson says Iraq's chemical weapons use will not change U.S. interest in pursuing closer U.S.-Iraq relations.
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 53: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD 139) from Ronald W. Reagan. "Measures to Improve U.S. Posture and Readiness to Respond to Developments in the Iran-Iraq War," April 5, 1984.
Ronald Reagan says that action must be taken to increase U.S. military capabilities and "intelligence collection posture" in the Persian Gulf.


Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, and Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey are to prepare a plan to prevent Iraq's defeat in the Iran-Iraq war. Reagan directs Shultz to ensure that the U.S. government's condemnation of the use of chemical weapons is unambiguous, while placing "equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 54: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to United States Embassy in Jordan. "Chemical Weapons: Meeting With Iraqi Charge," April 6, 1984.

Reports that Deputy Assistant Secretary of State James Placke discussed a draft United Nations' resolution on chemical weapons use in the Iran-Iraq war with Iraqi interests section representative Nizar Hamdoon on March 29. Hamdoon said that Iraq would prefer a Security Council presidential statement to a resolution. Placke indicated that the U.S. could accept Iraqi proposals regarding points that should be included in the resolution if the Security Council approves them. He said that the U.S. would like the Iraqi government's cooperation "in avoiding situations that would lead to difficult and possibly embarrassing situation[s]" regarding chemical weapons use, but noted that the U.S. did "not want this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship nor to detract from our common interest to see war brought to [an] early end."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 55: United States Interests Section. Iraq Cable from William L. Eagleton, Jr. to the Department of State. "Bell Discusses Possible Helicopter Sale to Iraq," April 12, 1984.

The U.S. interests section in Baghdad asks to be kept apprised of developments in ongoing talks between Iraq and Bell Helicopter Textron about its sale of helicopters to Iraq's Ministry of Defense that "can not be in any way configured for military use."
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

__________________
"When any government, or any church for that matter, undertakes to say to its subjects, This you may not read, this you must not see, this you are forbidden to know, the end result is tyranny and oppression no matter how holy the motives."

Document 56: Letter from Richard M. Nixon to Nicolae Ceausescu. [Regarding U.S.-Romanian Venture to Sell Uniforms to Iraq], May 3, 1984. Former president Richard Nixon sends a letter to Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu in support of a deal made by Colonel John Brennan, his former aide and chief of staff, and former attorney general John Mitchell, to buy Romanian-manufactured military uniforms for export to Iraq.



Media and criminal investigations of U.S. companies that had exported weapons-related or dual-use items to Iraq were conducted after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Many of these companies seemed to have connections with former U.S. government officials.
Source: Court exhibit

Document 57: Department of State, Special Adviser to the Secretary on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs Memorandum from Dick Gronet to Richard T. Kennedy. "U.S. Dual-Use Exports to Iraq: Specific Actions" [Includes Document Entitled "Dual Use Exports to Iraq" Dated April 27, 1984], May 9, 1984.



An internal State Department paper indicates that the government is reviewing policy for "the sale of certain categories of dual-use items to Iraqi nuclear entities," and the review's "preliminary results favor expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear entities."
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 58: Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report. "Defense Estimative Brief: Prospects for Iraq," September 25, 1984.
The Defense Intelligence Agency assesses political, economic, and military conditions in Iraq, predicts that it will continue to develop its conventional and "formidable" chemical capabilities, and will "probably pursue nuclear weapons." It says that Iraq is unlikely to use chemical weapons against Israel because of certain Israeli retaliation, and that U.S.-Iraqi relations will hinge on U.S. policy toward the Middle East, including its aid for Iraq.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 59: Department of State, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs Briefing Paper. "Iraqi Illegal Use of Chemical Weapons," November 16, 1984.
Indicates that the U.S. concluded some time ago that Iraq had used "domestically produced lethal CW" in the Iran-Iraq war, developed in part through "the unwitting and, in some cases, we believe witting assistance" of numerous Western firms. The State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs thinks that Iraq stopped using chemical weapons in response to a U.S. demarche in November 1983, and resumed their use in February 1984.
Source: Declassified through Congressional investigation

Document 60: Department of State Cable from George P. Shultz to the United States Embassy in Iraq. "Memcon [Memorandum of Conversation]: Secretary's Meeting with Iraqi DepPrimMin [Deputy Prime Minister] Tariq Aziz, November 26, 1984, 10:00 a.m.," November 29, 1984.
Following the restoration of formal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iraq, George Shultz meets with Tariq Aziz and emphasizes "the U.S. desire to base these relations on the presumption of equality, mutual respect, and reciprocity." After Aziz says that Iraq's advantage in weaponry was enabling it to defend itself against Iran, Secretary Shultz comments "that superior intelligence also must be an important factor in Iraq's defense.

Aziz acknowledged that this may be true." (The U.S. had been secretly providing Iraq with extensive intelligence support for several years.) Secretary Shultz concludes by welcoming the candor of the ongoing U.S.-Iraq dialogue, and remarks that "Iraq can expect the U.S. to maintain its opposition to both the use and production of chemical weapons. This position is not directed specifically at Iraq . . . "
Source: Declassified under the Freedom of Information Act

Document 61: United States District Court (Florida: Southern District) Affidavit. "United States of America, Plaintiff, v. Carlos Cardoen [et al.]" [Charge that Teledyne Wah Chang Albany Illegally Provided a Proscribed Substance, Zirconium, to Cardoen Industries and to Iraq], January 31, 1995.



Former Reagan administration National Security Council staff member Howard Teicher says that after Ronald Reagan signed a national security decision directive calling for the U.S. to do whatever was necessary to prevent Iraq's defeat in the Iran-Iraq war, Director of Central Intelligence William Casey personally led efforts to ensure that Iraq had sufficient weapons, including cluster bombs, and that the U.S. provided Iraq with financial credits, intelligence, and strategic military advice. The CIA also provided Iraq, through third parties that included Israel and Egypt, with military hardware compatible with its Soviet-origin weaponry.
This affidavit was submitted in the course of one of a number of prosecutions, following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, of U.S. companies charged with illegally delivering military, dual-use, or nuclear-related items to Iraq.


(In this case, a Teledyne affiliate was charged will illegally selling zirconium, used in the manufacture of explosives, to the Chilean arms manufacturer Carlos Industries, which used the material to manufacture cluster bombs sold to Iraq.) Many of these firms tried to defend themselves by establishing that providing military materiel to Iraq had been the actual, if covert, policy of the U.S. government. This was a difficult case to make, especially considering the rules of evidence governing investigations involving national security matters.
Source: Court case

__________________
"When any government, or any church for that matter, undertakes to say to its subjects, This you may not read, this you must not see, this you are forbidden to know, the end result is tyranny and oppression no matter how holy the motives."